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Manufactured Homes Under U.C.C. Revised Article 9: A New
Conflict Between Certificates of Title and Financing Statements
Creating and perfecting a security interest in manufactured
homes has long been an uncertain process.' Under the most recent
revisions Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), for the
first time, speaks directly to the topic of manufactured homes. The
UCC now supplies both a definition of "manufactured-home" and
rules on perfection and priority of security interests in
"manufactured-home transactions." 2 The drafters of Revised Article
9 have entered an arena where the UCC, state certificate of title
statutes, and local real estate law all contend to determine how
security interests are created and perfected. Although Revised
Article 9 somewhat clarifies how security interests in manufactured
homes are perfected and when they have priority over other secured
interests, uncertainty remains Specifically, the drafters have added a
1. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 65.20.010 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002) ("The legislature
recognizes that confusion exists regarding the classification of manufactured homes as
personal or real property. This results in a variety of problems, including: (1) Creating
confusion as to the creation, perfection, and priority of security interests ....
"); JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 24-5, at 859 (5th ed.
2001);
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INTERFACE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND CERTIFICATES OF TITLE 9-103(2)
(Reporter's Explanatory Note 2) (1996) ("The need to coordinate Article 9 with a variety
of non-uniform certificate of title statutes, the need to provide rules to take account of
goods that are covered by more than one certificate, and the need to govern the transition
from perfection by filing to perfection by notation all create pressure for a detailed and
complex set of rules."), available at http:/Iwww.law.upenn.edulbll/ulclucc9/ctfdstm4.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); C. Scott Pryor, How Revised Article 9 Will
Turn the Trustee's Strong-arm Into a Weak Finger: A Potpourriof Cases, 9 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 229, 261-62 (2001), at LEXIS, Secondary Legal Library, American
Bankruptcy Institute Law Review File (providing examples of the diverse methods
creditors have used to perfect security interests in manufactured homes).
2. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(53) (2001) (defining "[m]anufactured home"); id. § 9-102(a)(54)
(defining "[m]anufactured home transaction"); id. § 9-334(e)(4)(A)-(B) (establishing
priority of a perfected manufactured-home transaction security interest over real estate
encumbrances); id. § 9-515(b) (permitting a thirty-year effectiveness of financing
statements filed incident to a manufactured-home transaction).
3. The difficulty between whether the UCC or other state statutes control is not
unique to the manufactured-housing context. See, e.g., Joann H. Henderson, Coordination
of the Uniform Commercial Code with Other State Laws in the Farm FinancingContext, 14
IDAHO L. REV. 363,391-93 (1978) (discussing the relationship between the UCC and state
farm-financing laws).
4. A recent change on the North Carolina Secretary of State's web site illustrates the
confusion. In early September 2001, the answer to the question of whether manufactured
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layer of confusion by failing to explain how UCC section 9-515(b),
which provides for the filing of financing statements in connection
with manufactured-home transactions, interacts with existing
certificate of title statutes. Revised Article 9 sections 9-311(a)(2) and
9-334(e)(4) dictate deference to state certificate of title statutes in
establishing a method of perfection, but section 9-515(b) states that
perfection of a security interest in a manufactured-home transaction
should occur through filing a financing statement. This Recent
Development attempts to resolve the conflict among these provisions,
showing that section 9-515(b) should be applied in situations when a
certificate of title is not required.
In order to understand when section 9-515(b) will operate, it is
first necessary to examine the definition of manufactured homes.
Many terms are commonly used in association with "manufactured
home," including mobile home, trailer, and modular home.' Many
courts and commentators have recognized the potential confusion in
determining, for certificate of title purposes, whether certain property
fits the label of manufactured home.' Notably, certificate of title
homes were fixtures or personal property, was: "Are manufactured home lien filings
considered fixtures or personal property such as vehicles? Either one, depending upon
whether or not the manufactured home is attached to real property." NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FrequentlyAsked Questions: UCC Revised
Article 9, at http://www.secretary.state.nc.us/ucc/uccfaq.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2001) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions]. The
answer goes on to state that if the manufactured home is attached to the ground with its
wheels removed, filing occurs in the real property index. If the home is not attached to the
ground, and retains its wheels, filing occurs in the central filing office. Id. By late
September 2001, the answer had changed: "Revised Article 9 has generated some
question regarding how security interests in manufactured homes should be perfected
under North Carolina law. The question relates to the interaction of Revised Article 9
and North Carolina's Certificate of Title law." The answer continues by stating that
although the office will accept financing statements on manufactured homes, legal counsel
is advisable. Id.
5. Holiday Acres Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Wise, 998 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Colo. App.
2000), modified, 2000 Colo. App. LEXIS 1192 (Colo. Ct. App. July 6, 2000) ("There are
indeed differences in the construction of trailer homes and mobile, modular, [and]
manufactured [homes]. However, various bodies of law use the terms interchangeably.");
Katharine N. Rosenberry, Home Businesses, Llamas and Aluminum Siding: Trends in
Covenant Enforcement, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 443, 467 (1998) (discussing various
terms associated with manufactured homes in the context of restrictive covenants).
6. See, e.g., Albany Disc. Corp. v. Mohawk Nat'l Bank, 269 N.E.2d 809, 810 (N.Y.
1971) ("The briefest consideration yields the view that precise definition [of a mobile
home] is elusive .... ); Assocs. Capital Corp. v. Cookeville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 569
S.W.2d 474, 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) ("The definition of a 'mobile home' for legal
purposes will vary according to the circumstances, that is, not only according to the nature
and surroundings of the vehicle or building itself but also according to the purpose and
context of the legal definition"); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 24-5, at 859; Paul M.
Shupack, On Boundariesand Definitions: A Commentary on Dean Baird, 80 VA. L. REV.
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definitions vary among states.7 Revised Article 9 attempted to
resolve the differences by narrowly defining manufactured homes,
closely following the definition in 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6). 8 By stating
specific minimum dimension requirements of either eight-by-forty
feet or footage totaling 320 square feet, the definition rules out small
trailers. By requiring a permanent chassis,9 the statute also excludes
modular or prefabricated homes.' 0
The Revised Article 9 definition of manufactured homes is
helpful in two respects. First, the definition of a manufactured home
is particularly important for those states that have not explicitly
defined manufactured homes under certificate of title legislation." In

2273, 2280 (1994) (recognizing the ambiguity in certificate of title definitions). In many
cases, the terms manufactured home and mobile home are used interchangeably. See, e.g.,
Adams v. Greenpoint Credit Corp. (In re Earls), 243 B.R. 101, 102 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1999),
affd, 232 F.3d 901 (10th Cir. 2000) ("In the record, the home is referred to
interchangeably as a 'manufactured home' and a 'mobile home'; we see no need to
distinguish between the terms in this appeal."). When a state certificate of title statute
defines a mobile home differently than the manufactured home definition of U.C.C. § 9102(53), further difficulties arise. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., infra note 11 (providing examples of state certificate of title definitions).
Some definitions leave out dimensional requirements. See, e.g., infra note 11. Many
contain requirements relating to internal amenities. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2164(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 2002) ("Containing sleeping accommodations, a flush toilet, tub
or shower bath, kitchen facilities and plumbing and electrical connections for attachment
to outside systems .... ).
8. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(53) (2001). The definition is as follows:
"Manufactured home" means a structure, transportable in one or more sections,
which, in the traveling mode, is eight body feet or more in width or forty body
feet or more in length, or, when erected on site, is three hundred twenty or more
square feet, and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as
a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the
required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and
electrical systems contained therein. The term includes any structure that meets
all of the requirements of this paragraph except the size requirements and with
respect to which the manufacturer voluntarily files a certification required by the
United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and complies with
the standards established under Title 42 of the United States Code.
Id.
9. A chassis is "[t]he rectangular steel frame, supported on springs and attached to
the axles, that holds the body and motor of an automotive vehicle." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 324 (3d ed. 1992). The wheels of
a manufactured home may be removed without disturbing the chassis. Ass'n for
Regulatory Reform v. Pierce, 670 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (D.D.C. 1987), vacated on other
grounds, 849 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
10. 1 ELDON H. REILEY, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 24:2 (3d
ed. 1999) (quoting U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(53)).
11. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.10.661 (Michie 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3-2 (2001);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-2 (1985 & Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.010,
§ 186A.345 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. § 168A.01 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT.
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such states, judicial decisions often determine which manufactured

homes are subject to certificate of title statutes, rather than legislative
rule, thereby creating uncertainty over what property is classified as a
manufactured home. 12 In the interest of uniformity, states lacking a
definition may adopt the Revised Article 9 definition in their
certificate of title acts.

financing

Second, the definition limits the extended

statement's 13 effectiveness

of section 9-515(b) to cover only

large sized manufactured homes and only for thirty years. 4 These

larger manufactured homes will inevitably cost more, therefore
increasing the need for long-term financing. 5
Despite the general usefulness of the "manufactured home" and

"manufactured-home transaction" definitions, the purpose for their
inclusion in the UCC elicits some questions. For instance, state law
may require a certificate of title for a manufactured home, but that
same home may not fit the requirements laid out in Revised Article
9.16

The likely outcome is that the security interests in these

§ 60-102 (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-38 to -71.1 (1999); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:1-1 (West
1990 & Supp. 2001); OR. REv. STAT. § 803 (1997).
12. In North Carolina, certificates of title were required for mobile homes under King
Homes, Inc. v. Bryson, 273 N.C. 84, 89 (1968). In those states defining manufactured
homes, the definition often lacks dimensional requirements or reference to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) standards. For example:
"Manufactured home" means a preconstructed building unit or combination or
preconstructed building units without motive power designed and commonly
used for residential occupancy by persons in either temporary or permanent
locations, which unit or units are manufactured in a factory or at a location other
than the residential site of the completed home.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-29-102 (2001); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1149.2(2), (3) (West
2000) (" 'Manufactured home' means a mobile home ....'Mobile home' means a factory
assembled structure or structures transportable in one or more sections, with or without a
permanent foundation, and includes the plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical
systems."); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001) (" 'Mobile Home.'
A trailer designed and used exclusively for living quarters or commercial purposes which
exceeds the maximum size limitations prescribed by this title for operation on a highway
and is only incidentally operated on a highway."); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 340.01 (29) (West
1999 & Supp. 2000) (" 'Mobile home' means a vehicle designed to be towed as a single
unit or in sections upon a highway by a motor vehicle and equipped and used or intended
to be used, primarily for human habitation, with walls of rigid uncollapsible
construction.").
13. A financing statement is filed, usually with the secretary of state, to serve as a
warning to potential creditors that the property in question is encumbered. See WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 1, at § 21-1, at 712.
14. U.C.C. § 9-515(b) (2001) ("[A]n initial financing statement filed in connection
with a public-finance transaction or manufactured-home transaction is effective for a
period of 30 years after the date of filing.").
15. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
16. A manufactured or mobile home could fail to meet the UCC definition of
"manufactured home" if the certificate of title statute did not state minimum dimension
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manufactured homes, covered by the state certificate of title statute
but not included within the Revised Article 9 definition, will not
benefit from the priority rules established by section 9-334. Further,
it is possible that instead, they will be subjected to any number of
outcomes under controlling state law.'7 The priority rule in section 9334 will likely have no effect when a manufactured home may be
eligible for perfection and priority using the requirement of the
Revised Article 9 definition, but a certificate of title may not be
required to establish ownership.' 8 For the vast majority of cases,
though, the UCC definition of "manufactured home" in section 9102(53) and the "manufactured-home transaction" priority rule in
section 9-334 allows a security interest perfected pursuant to a
certificate of title statute to have priority over a real estate
encumbrance.' 9
In light of all the unnamed categories of transactions that
Revised Article 9 governs, the presence of the "manufactured-home
transaction" is conspicuous. By defining the manufactured-home
transaction, Revised Article 9 settles a long-standing controversy
splitting the courts: whether a security interest perfected on a
certificate of title has priority over a real property encumbrance.2 °

requirements. Several states have not defined manufactured homes by reference to
dimensions. E.g., ALA. CODE § 32-8-2(9) (1999); COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-29-102 (2001);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1149.2(2), (3) (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 125.2302(g) (West 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 340.01(29) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001).
17. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (exploring the significance of section
9-334). When state law gives priority to a recorded mortgage over notation on the
certificate of title, failure to meet the "manufactured home" definitional requirements in
the UCC would defeat the priority rule established for manufactured-home transactions in
section 9-334(2)(4)(b). See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
18. Section 9-334(e)(4)(b) requires notation of a security interest on the certificate of
title before perfection. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text (suggesting that
section 9-515(b) may be tailored for such a situation).
19. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 24-5, at 858. In a typical situation, financing
is required for the purchase of a manufactured home. The creditors who level purchase
money secure their interest by notation on the certificate of title. At a later date, the
manufactured home owner may mortgage the real property upon which the manufactured
home sits. Section 9-334(e)(4)(b) gives priority to the first creditor.
20. Compare Altegra Credit Co. v. Banks (In re Banks), 259 B.R. 848, 851 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that although a certificate of title was no longer required when
the manufactured home was affixed to the ground and that a security interest perfected by
notation on the certificate of title had priority over the real property encumbrance), with
Assocs. Capital Corp. v. Cookeville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 569 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978) (holding that the mortgagee's interest in real estate had priority over the
secured party noted on the certificate of title). In many respects, however, the
disagreement was less about disputes under Former Article 9, and more about the tension
between state certificate of title statutes and state real property law.
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Certificate of title statutes originally sought to deter sales of
stolen motor vehicles.21 Gradually, they began to serve other
functions, including providing a means to perfect a security interest in
the vehicle32 Currently, every state's certificate of title statute
provides that the only way to perfect a security interest in the goods
covered by a certificate is by notation on the certificate of title.2 The
circumstances in which certificate of title statutes apply to
manufactured homes are unclear, however. Because perfection under
the UCC predominantly occurs through the filing of financing
statements, and perfection under certificate of title statutes is
accomplished exclusively through notation on the certificate of title,
any uncertainty concerning the scope of a certificate of title statute
creates an inherent tension between the UCC and the existing state

law. Much difficulty is avoided when a certificate of title statute
21. BARNET HODES & G. GALE ROBERSON, THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES 58 (3d
ed. 1974); Note, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles Under the UCC: A New Chassis for
Certificate of Title Legislation, 70 YALE L.J. 995, 995 (1961).
22. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58 (1999) (indicating how a security interest may
be perfected on a certificate of title by notation of the secured party's name and address
on the certificate of title).
23. Id.; see ALA. CODE §§ 32-8-61 to -67 (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 28.10.231 (Michie
2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 28-2132, -2135 (1998 & Supp. 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 2714-802 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 2001); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 6301, 6303 (West 2000); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 42-6-120 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-185 (West 1994 & Supp.
2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2332 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 50-1202 (2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 319.27(1) (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3-50 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 286-41(c) (1985 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 49-510 (Michie 1998); 625 ILL. COMiP.
STAT. ANN. 5/3-202 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-17-2-2 (Michie 1997);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.50 (West 1997 & Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-135(c)(5)
(1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186A.190 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2001); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32:710 (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A § 702 (West 1996 & Supp.
2001); MD. CODE. ANN. TRANSP. §§ 13-202 to -207 (1999 & Supp. 2000); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 90D, § 21 (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 2002); MICH. COMe. LAWS § 257.238
(2001); MINN. STAT. § 168A.17 (2001); MiSs. CODE ANN. § 63-21-43 (1999 & Supp. 2001);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 301.600 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-3-103 (2001); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 60-110 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 482.424 to 482.432 (Michie 1998 & Supp.
2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:24 (1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:10-9 (West 1990 &
Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3-201 to -202 (Michie 2001); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAW § 2118 (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-01-05.1 (1987 &
Supp. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4505.13 (Anderson 1999 & Supp. 2001); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1110 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 803.097 (1997); 75
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1106 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-3.1-19 (2000);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-19-620 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-3-41 (Michie
1998 & Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-3-123 to -137 (1998); TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 501.111 (Vernon 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-la-601 to -606 (1998 & Supp.
2001); VT. STAT. ANN. fit. 23, § 2042 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-638 (Michie 1998 &
Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.12.095 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 17A-4A-1 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. § 342.19 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-103 (Michie 2001).
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defines manufactured homes in a manner similar to Revised Article

9.24 Such states can benefit the most from the innovation of section 9334: resolution of the disagreement over the priority of interests
perfected through notation on the certificates of title when the

manufactured home is considered a fixture.
The creditor who has a perfected security interest noted on the
certificate of title is protected against a real estate creditor or owner

with a real property interest in the land3
Section 9-334(e)(4)
removes the need for determining when a manufactured home has
become a fixture-whether the manufactured home is considered a

"good" or a "fixture," the only method for perfecting a security
interest is through a certificate of title statute as provided in section 9311(a)(2). 26 While Revised Article 9 resolves the battle between

certificates of title and fixture filings, it creates a potential conflict
between certificates of title and financing statements. 27 Revised
Article 9 does not indicate when a certificate of title is needed instead
of a financing statement.
Prior to the enactment of Revised Article 9, little attention was

paid to the validity of a financing statement to perfect a security
interest in a manufactured home. Even though the vast majority of
security interests generally were perfected through filing a financing
statement,28 the settled practice for manufactured homes was a
notation on the certificate of title.29 Some situations arose when a
24. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-4105(13) (Michie 1998) (describing "manufactured home"
according to the HUD definition in 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6) (2000)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 584202(a) (1994) (same); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-21-50) (1999 & Supp. 2001) (same); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 700.010(5) (West 2000) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 489.113(1)
(Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001) (same); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 122-c (McKinney 1996)
(same).
25. See U.C.C. § 9-334(e)(4) (2001).
26. The uniform version of section 9-311(a)(2) states: "Except as otherwise provided
in subsection (d), the filing of a financing statement is not necessary or effective to perfect
a security interest in property subject to: (2) ... any certificate-of-title statutes
covering.., mobile homes." U.C.C. § 9-311(a)(2) (2001).
27. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text (explaining the tension between
certificates of title and financing statements). Revised Article 9 does not help resolve
disputes between fixture filings and real estate mortgages.
28. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 22-10, at 779.
29. E.g., Dodson v. One Valley Bank of Oak Hill, Inc. (In re Johnson), 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23408, at *4 (4th Cir. 1993); Altegra Credit Co. v. Banks (In re Banks), 259
B.R. 848, 851 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001); Smith v. Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. (In re
Avery), 7 B.R. 28, 29-30 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980); Hughes v. Young 115 N.C. App. 325, 32930, 444 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1994); Peoples Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 103
N.C. App. 762, 766-67, 407 S.E.2d 251, 253-54 (1991); Millersport Bank Co. v. Blauser,
1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 9558, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v.
Nordmark, 684 P.2d 1, 3 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). But see Shelter Am. Corp. v. Ray, 800 P.2d
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certificate of title was not required for a manufactured home, 0 but
when one was required, notation on the certificate usually provided
the exclusive method for perfection.31
Revised Article 9
acknowledges the exclusivity of certificate of title perfection in
section 9-311, which states "the filing of a financing statement is not
necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject
to: ...certificate of title statute[s]. ' '32 Section 9-515(b), however,
allows for perfection of manufactured-home transactions through
financing statements. The apparent conflict between sections 9311(a)(2) and 9-515(b) is reconciled only through acknowledging
situations when a certificate of title is not required, thus allowing
financing statements to perfect security interests in manufactured
homes in those cases.3 3

743, 746 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a mortgagee had a superior interest to the
security interest perfected by notation on the certificate of title); Rose v. Russell, 1990
Tenn. App. LEXIS 294, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the proper method of
perfecting a security interest in a mobile home affixed to the ground was submitting a
fixture filing, not notation on the certificate of title); Citizens Bank of Mich. City v.
Hansom, 497 N.E.2d 581, 585 (Ind.Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a purchaser of real estate
was not subject to the security interest noted on the manufactured home's certificate of
title) (superseded by IND. CODE ANN. § 9-17-6-7 (Michie 1991)); Assocs. Capital Corp. v.
Cookeville Prod. Credit Assoc., 569 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (holding a
mortgagee's interest to be superior to a security interest noted on certificate of title).
Only four states do not require notation of security interests on certificates of title:
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont. HODES & ROBERSON, supra note
21, at 58 & n.11. Since initial publication of The Law of Mobile Homes, Alabama,
Mississippi, and New York have subjected manufactured homes to certificate of title
statutes. See ALA. CODE § 32-8-31(9) (Michie 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-21-9 (1999 &
Supp. 2001); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 2102(19) (McKinney 1996).
30. When a state does not have certificate of title legislation applicable to
manufactured homes, perfection would occur through a financing statement. See, e.g.,
Mullen v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 730 So. 2d 9, 14-15 (Miss. 1998) (holding that a security
interest perfects absent notation on certificate of title); Albany Disc. Corp. v. Mohawk
Nat'l Bank, 269 N.E.2d 809, 811-12 (N.Y. 1971) (holding that a financing statement is
required to perfect a security interest); First Shelby Nat'l Bank v. Mitchell, 406 So. 2d 959,
961 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (holding that a financing statement perfects a security interest).
31. See supra note 25.
32. U.C.C. § 9-311(a)(2) (2001) (emphasis added).
33. The inclusion of section 9-515(b) may be an attempt by the drafters to move away
from perfection of goods under certificate of title statutes. See AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE,

REVISIONS CONCERNING FEDERAL-STATE

INTERFACE,

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY, AND CERTIFICATES OF TITLE 9-103 (2) (Reporters' Explanatory Note 2)

(1996), available at http:llwww.law.upenn.edulblllulc/ucc9/ctfdstm4.htm (last visited Apr.
18,2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The ALI states:
We strongly suspect that Article 9 could be made simpler and the Drafting
Committee's work significantly reduced if perfection of security interests were
divorced from certificate of title statutes. We encourage the Drafting Committee
to consider having the normal filing rules apply to perfection of security interests
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The "manufactured-home transaction," defined in section 9102(a)(54), provides the scope for when section 9-334(e)(4) will give
priority to a secured interest perfected on a certificate of title as
against an encumbrance on real property. Not every transaction
involving a manufactured home will fall under section 9-334(e)(4):
the provision covers only those secured transactions creating a
purchase money security interest in the manufactured home, or those
when the manufactured home serves as the primary collateral.?4
Section 9-334(e)(4) requires the security interest in the manufacturedhome transaction to be "perfected pursuant to a statute described in
section 9-311(a)(2)."' 5 The UCC is largely coherent up to this point;
difficulty arises with the introduction of section 9-515(b).

In rendering financing statements ineffective for manufactured
homes covered by certificate of title statutes, section 9-311(a)(2)
conflicts directly with section 9-515(b), which seems to give
permission to perfect security interests through filing, and extends the
filing period to thirty years.36 The purpose of section 9-515(b) is
unclear at best because almost all states require perfection of
in goods subject to a certificate of title statute, particularly goods other than
automobiles.
Id
34. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(54).
35. Id. § 9-334(e)(4). Section 9-311(a) states: "[T]he filing of a financing statement is
not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to: ...(2) [list
any certificate-of-title statute.., which provides for a security interest to be indicated on
the certificate as a condition or result of perfection... ]."Id.§ 9-311(a)(2). Sections 9334(e)(4) and 9-311(a)(2) work together to void the priority rule of 9-334(e)(4) for
security interests in manufactured homes not covered by certificate of title statutes or
other state-created filing systems. Id.§ 9-311(a)(2); id. § 9-334(2)(4).
36. "[A]n initial financing statement filed in connection with a public-finance
transaction or manufactured-home transaction is effective for a period of 30 years after
the date of filing ....
" Id. § 9-515(b). Financing statements generally remain effective for
five years. Id. § 9-515(a). Because manufactured home financing has become increasingly
difficult to attain, most available financing is long-term, thereby justifying an exception to
the standard rule. See David Holzel, Open Sesame: The ManufacturedHousing Industry
Is Seeking GreaterAccess to FinancingSources in 2001, MODERN HOMES ON-LINE, MayJune 2001, at http:1216.167.103.115/modernhomeslFEAT_open-sesame.html (discussing
difficulties in securing manufactured-home financing) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). In 2000, the average price of a single-wide manufactured home was $30,400
while double-wides averaged $53,900. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AvERAGE SALES PRICE
OF NEW MANUFACrURED HOMES BY REGION AND SIZE OF HOME, available at
http:l/www.census.gov/constlwwwlmhsindex.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2000) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). In fact, West Virginia has changed the thirty-year rule
in section 9-515(b) to allow for forty-year effectiveness. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-515(b)
(Michie 2001). Cases such as In re McRae illustrate the impetus for the exception to the
five-year rule. See McRae v. Sec. Pac. Hous. Serv. (In re McRae) 628 So. 2d 429,432 (Ala.
1993) (holding that a mobile home financing statement has a duration of five years unless
it indicates that an extended period applies).

1838

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

manufactured homes by notation of the security interest on the
certificate of title.37 At worst, section 9-515(b) could become a trap
for practitioners unfamiliar with Revised Article 9.38 Filing a
financing statement is not qualified according to section 9-515(b), nor
is section 9-311(a)(2) cross-referenced,39 so practitioners might
assume that Revised Article 9 permits manufactured home perfection
through financing statements.
Significantly, Louisiana, Washington, North Dakota, and
Georgia, have not adopted section 9-515(b).40 Of these four states,
Louisiana and Washington have indicated the purpose for the
omission in their official comments.41 Louisiana rejected section 9515(b) as irreconcilable with section 9-311(a)(2). 42 After stating that
the UCC manufactured-home definition in section 9-102(53) was
rejected in favor of Louisiana's, the Louisiana official comment
continues: "[Iln revised Chapter 9, security interests in manufactured
homes are not perfected by the filing of ordinary financing statements
alone, but instead the security interest is noted on the certificate of
title. Accordingly, the thirty-year rule in revised U.C.C. Article 9
43
[section 9-515(b)] is suppressed in Louisiana as unnecessary."
Washington made several substantive changes to the uniform
version of the Code in order to avoid conflicts with state law. First,
the drafters changed the definition of "manufactured home" in
section 9-102(53) to accord with an existing state definition."
Additionally, Washington completely eliminated the "manufacturedhome transaction" of section 9-102(54). 45 Washington recognized that
the purpose of the "manufactured-home transaction" was to allow for
37. See supra note 29 (citing the states that do not require notation of the security
interest on the certificate of title).
38. The standard UCC forms provided to the states heighten this possibility. The
"UCC Financing Statement Addendum" allows a secured party to check a box on the
lower right-hand comer of the form if the financing statement is "filed in connection with
a Manufactured-Home Transaction-effective 30 years." U.C.C. § 9-521(a). Although
individual jurisdictions are allowed, even encouraged at times, to make changes to the
uniform text, section 9-521 requires that a state filing office accept the uniform forms
provided in section 9-521. Id.
39. Financing statements are not effective are not effective to perfect security
interests in goods subject to certificates of title. U.C.C. § 9-311 (a)(2) (2001).
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 11-9-515(b) (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-102 (West
2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-86(2) (1987 & Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 62A.9A-515(b) (1994 & Supp. 2002).
41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §10:9-102 cmt. 53(b); WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9A-cmt. 3.
42. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §10:9-102 cmt. 53(b).
43. Id.
44. Compare U.C.C. § 9-102(53), with WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9A-102(53).
45. Compare U.C.C. § 9-102(54), with WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9A-102(54).
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the special priority rule in section 9-334(e)(4).46 In Washington's
view, its statutes had already anticipated the innovations regarding
manufactured homes in Revised Article 9.47 Because the legislature

had already addressed the problem of priority in Washington Revised
Code section 65.20, any reference to manufactured homes in their
Revised Article 9 was unnecessary.48
Neither

Georgia

nor North Dakota have

issued

official

comments, so the rationales for omitting section 9-515(b) from their
versions of Revised Article 9 are unclear. Georgia has deleted any
reference to manufactured homes.4 9 North Dakota has included all
references to manufactured homes except in section 9-515(b).5 0 This
absence arguably suggests the possibility that the North Dakota

legislature

sought to avoid inclusion of the "public-finance
'51

transaction" rather than the "manufactured-home transaction.

Besides Louisiana, Washington, Georgia, and North Dakota, all
other jurisdictions have adopted section 9-515(b), creating a need for
each jurisdiction to interpret the relationship between financing
statements and certificates of title. Although there is a presumption
that certificate of title statutes apply in almost every state to

manufactured-home transactions, elementary principals of statutory
interpretation dictate a construction of section 9-515(b) so that the
statute may take effect rather than fail.52
46. Security interests in manufactured homes perfected pursuant to a certificate of
title statute now have priority over certain real property encumbrances. U.C.C. § 9334(e)(4). The Washington Official Comments indicate the purpose for omitting sections
9-102(54) and 9-334(e)(4): "[Chapter 65.20 RCW, enacted in 1989, provides a means for
eliminating the title certificate and converting or merging a manufactured home into the
real property on which it is installed. Once converted, the manufactured home is treated
no differently than any other real property for title or security purposes." Id. § 62A.9A102 cmt. 3.
47. § 62A.9A-102 cmt. 3.
48. Id. § 62A.9A-334 cmt. 1.
49. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-102(a)(53), -102(a)(54), -334(e)(4)(A-B), -515(b)
(2001) (omitting any reference to "manufactured homes").
50. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 41-09-02(1)(ccc), (ddd), 41-09-54(5)(d), 41-09-86(2) (1987 &
Supp. 2001).
51. Section 9-515(b) allows for thirty-year financing statement effectiveness for both
the manufactured-home transaction and the public-finance transaction. U.C.C. § 9-515(b).
The North Dakota Century Code leaves out reference to manufactured homes only in
section 9-515(b), while it completely omits reference to public-finance transactions. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 41-09-86 (2001). The UCC defines "public-finance transaction" in section
9-102(a)(67).
52. Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118, 124 (1902) ("There is a presumption against a
construction which would render a statute ineffective...."); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101
U.S. 112, 115-16 (1879) (using the statutory maxim to reconcile language that allowed
sellers to offer a property interest for a limited term of "one or more years" and language
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Three distinct interpretations of section 9-515(b) warrant
examination:
(1) section 9-515(b) is intended for use when
manufactured homes are purchased for inventory; (2) section 9515(b) is intended for manufactured homes in existence before the
certificate of title statutes were enacted; and (3) section 9-515(b)
applies when the motor vehicle act of a given state does not require a
certificate of title for the manufactured home. Evaluation of each
interpretation demonstrates that only the third interpretation is
viable, and that one of three potential amendments is required to

ensure that section 9-515(b) causes no conflict with the state
certificate of title statute: (1) indicating in the state certificate of title
statute which manufactured homes require certificates of title;53 (2)
indicating that the section only applies to manufactured homes not
requiring a certificate of title; or (3) deleting section 9-515(b).
Given the maxim of statutory interpretation that each statutory

provision be interpreted to give it effect, it is possible that section 9515(b) was intended to apply to manufactured homes that are held as
inventory. Retail mobile home dealers purchase large quantities of
manufactured homes, and a certificate of title is not required to
transfer ownership.5 4 Therefore, a financing statement is the ideal
method to perfect a purchase money security interest in the
manufactured homes.5
Like all dealers of goods covered by
certificate of title statutes, manufactured-home dealers can file a
financing statement to perfect an interest in inventory even if the
certificate of title statute would otherwise apply. 6 It could follow that
that seemingly gave a purchaser "the right to retain the possession thereof during his term
so long as he chooses"); United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203, 207 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968)
(citing the maxim of statutory interpretation "against construing a statute as containing
superfluous or meaningless words or giving it a construction that would render it
ineffective"); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmaticsand the Maxims of Interpretation, WIS. L.
REV. 1179, 1184 (1990) (citing the maxim that "[t]here is a strong presumption against
interpreting a statute so as to render it ineffective").
53. Some states have not included a definition of manufactured homes for certificate
of title purposes, despite the fact that, in those states, manufactured homes are subject to
such statutes. ALASKA STAT. § 28.10.661 (Michie 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3-2 (2001);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-2 (1985 & Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.010,
§186A.345 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. § 168A.01 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 60-102 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:1-1 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 20-38 to -71.1 (1999). Other states could more specifically define "manufactured
home" to follow the definition in Revised Article 9.
54. G. Ray Warner, Automobiles and Titled Collateral Under Revised Article 9, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., 18, 18 (2000), at LEXIS, Secondary Legal Library, American Bankruptcy
Institute Journal File.
55. Id.
56. U.C.C. § 9-311(d) ("During any period in which collateral subject to a statute
specified in subsection (a)(2) is inventory held for sale or lease by a person or leased by
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because of the nature of the manufactured-home business, these
dealers may need a longer period of time than the five-year limit
otherwise applicable to perfect by filing. Section 9-515(b), however,
applies only to the "manufactured-home transaction," a definition
supplied by section 9-102(a)(53) and specifically excluding
manufactured homes held as inventory. 7 Therefore, section 9-515(b)
does not govern perfection of a security interest in manufactured
homes held as inventory.
Second, section 9-515(b) could also be intended to apply to
manufactured homes existing before the certificate of title statutes
were enacted. Assuming that a manufactured home has not been
moved from the time the certificate of title statute was passed, there
may be no invocation of the certificate of title statute. 5 Thus, filing a
financing statement under section 9-515(b) would protect the secured
parties' security interests for an additional thirty years 9 Most
certificate of title statutes have been in effect for a considerable
time,6° far beyond the time-line of normal financing arrangements.
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that creditors would still be filing
financing statements on a manufactured home purchased forty years
ago.
Finally, a third permissible construction for section 9-515(b)
would apply the provision when the motor vehicle act of a given state
does not expressly require a certificate of title for the manufactured
home. 61 Initially, this interpretation is open to a similar criticism,
considering that certificate of title statutes in virtually every state
have been applied to manufactured housing; it seems a rare occasion
when the certificate of title statute would not apply. In fact, though,
there are currently four states that do not expressly require a
certificate of title for manufactured homes.62 Furthermore, in states
subjecting manufactured homes to certificates of title, certain
exceptions may permit perfection and priority to be determined by
that person as a lessor and that person is in the business of selling goods of that kind, this
section (prohibiting the filing of financing statements) does not apply to a security interest
in that collateral created by that person.").
57. Id § 9-102(a)(54).
58. In this instance, manufactured homes may never have received a certificate of
title.
59. § 9-515(b).
60. As of 1961, forty states had enacted certificate of title legislation. Note, supra
note 21, at 996 n.10.
61. ELDON H. REILEY, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 15:20 (3d
ed. 2001).
62. The four states are Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont. See
HODES & ROBERSON, supra note 21, at 58 & n.1.
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means other than notation on the certificate of title.63 For example, a
bankruptcy court in North Carolina explicitly held that a security
interest was not perfected by notation on a manufactured-home
certificate of title in In re Wester.6 Financing statements may also
prove effective when state certificate of title statutes allow the title to
be purged through application to the department of motor vehicles. 65
63. These states have statutes that either explicitly remove manufactured homes from
the certificate of title requirement or fail to mention manufactured homes. See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 2012(9) (1999) ("No certificate of title need be obtained for [a]ny other type
of vehicle designed primarily for off-highway use and deemed exempt by the
commissioner."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:1 (1993) (omitting mention of
manufactured homes). In Oklahoma, the possibility that a large percentage of
manufactured homes may not require certificates of title has been suggested in dictum.
See In re Gray, 40 B.R. 429,434 n.4 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984) ("(Questions may be raised
as to whether mobile homes constructed and intended at inception to be attached to
realty, should not be financed in the same manner as conventional homes.)"). This Recent
Development contends it is unlikely, however, that financing statements would ever
replace certificates of title because mortgages would be more appropriate.
64. 229 B.R. 348, 353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1998). Although previous decisions had held
that a certificate of title is no longer effective once the manufactured home is affixed to
the ground, see supra note 29 (listing cases), In re Wester carved out a special exception to
the certificate of title requirement on wholly different grounds. In re Wester, 229 B.R. at
353 (holding that a certificate of title was not required for a manufactured home
purchased from a manufactured-home dealer and already affixed to the ground). It is
conceivable that a financing statement would be a permissible method of perfection on the
facts of In re Wester. Wester, 229 B.R. at 353. The case involved the purchase, by Wester,
of a manufactured home from a manufactured home dealer that had already affixed the
home to real estate. Id at 349. The court found that no certificate of title was required
when the dealer placed the manufactured home on real estate because of the
manufacturer-dealer exception. Iii at 351-52; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-51(1) (2000)
(recognizing an exception to the certificate of title requirement for manufacturers, dealers,
and non-residents). The determining question was whether, upon purchase of the
manufactured home by Wester (a non-dealer), a certificate of title was required. The
court reasoned that even though the manufactured home fell within the scope of the
certificate-of-title statute, because Wester did not intend to operate the manufactured
home on the highway, a certificate of title was not required. 229 B.R. at 353. The statute
indicating which motor vehicles required certificates of title read: "[ELvery owner of a
vehicle intended to be operated upon any highway of this State... shall, before the same is
so operated, apply to the Division for ... a certificate of title." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2050(a) (1998) (emphasis added).
65. The following twenty-three states have enacted statutes that either allow for the
purging of title or permit purchasers of new manufactured homes to avoid titling
altogether when they intend to attach the manufactured home permanently to the ground:
ARIz. REv. STAT. § 28-2063(A)(3) (1998 & Supp. 2001); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 18551(a)(3)-(6) (West 1992 & Supp. 2002); COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-29-118 (2001); GA.
CODE ANN. § 40-3-31.1 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 63-305(1)-(4) (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 435.26(1)-(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186A.297
(Michie 1997 & Supp. 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1149.6 (West 2000); MINN. STAT.
§ 168A.141 (2001); MIss. CODE ANN. § 27-53-15 (1999 & Supp. 2001); MO. STAT. ANN.
§ 700.111 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-1-116 (2001); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 361.244(1)-(2) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:10-11-1 (West 1990 &
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These statutes recognize that a manufactured home may become real

estate, thereby rendering a certificate of title irrelevant. Accordingly,
Revised Article 9 recognizes the extinction of certificates of title in
section 9-303(b): "Goods cease to be covered by a certificate of title
at the ...time the certificate of title ceases to be effective under the
law of the issuing jurisdiction."66
Apart from these states and other limited exceptions as

illustrated in the In re Wester case, section 9-515(b) will have no use.
Given the provision's limited effect and the confusion it will likely
create, the wisdom of its presence in Revised Article 9 is
questionable. The drafters easily could have included a direction to

the states that section 9-515(b) only allows a financing statement to be
effective when a state statute does not require a manufactured-home
certificate of title. Moreover, all or portions of section 9-515(b) could
have been enclosed in brackets to indicate deference to controlling
state law.67 At this time, after the adoption of section 9-515(b) in
virtually every state, legislators are faced with three potential
amendments: (1) indicating in the state certificate of title statute
which manufactured homes require certificates of title; (2) including
in section 9-515(b) an indication that the section only applies to
manufactured homes not requiring a certificate of title; or (3) deleting
section 9-515(b).
First, by indicating in the certificate of title statute which

manufactured homes require certificates of title, some security
interests may benefit from the extended financing statement
effectiveness of section 9-515(b). When the certificate of title statute
Supp. 2001); Act of Dec. 19, 2001, ch. 506, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws §2-3, 506 (2001); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4505.11 (Anderson 1999 & Supp. 2001); OR. REV.STAT. § 820.510
(1997); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1140(A) (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); TEx. CIV. STAT. art.
5221f § 19(1) (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-la-503(2) (1998 & Supp. 2001);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 65.20.040 (West 1999); 2001 Wis. Legis. Serv. 16 § 2539(d)
(West); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-502 (Michie 2001).
According to most of these statutes, a financing statement would not be effective
because the manufactured home becomes part of the real estate through purging. Upon
severing the manufactured home from the ground, the owner is required to reapply for a
certificate of title. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 63-305(4) (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-653
(Michie 1998) ("[A]t such time as the wheels and other equipment previously used for
mobility have been removed and the unit has been attached to the realty.... the Virginia
title issued for the unit may be returned to the Department for cancellation.. . ."); see also
ENT Fed. Credit Union v. Chrysler First Fin. Serv. Corp., 826 P.2d 430, 432 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1992) (explaining the procedure for purging certificate of title).
66. U.C.C. § 9-303(b) (2001).
67. Section 9-502 provides an example of this approach when the uniform text
concludes wvith a legislative note: "Language in brackets is optional." Id. § 9-502
(Legislative Note).
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articulates the exceptions, 61 creditors will have more confidence in
their ability to take advantage of perfection through financing
statements. 69 For example, the certificate-of-title statute in In re
Wester could have indicated that purchases from manufacture-dealers
of manufactured homes already affixed to the ground need not apply
for a certificate of title. Second, the conflict between certificates of
title and financing statements could be resolved by indicating in
section 9-515(b) that it applies only to manufactured homes not
requiring a certificate of title. This approach renders section 9-515(b)
largely irrelevant in most states, while still permitting the extensive
use of financing statements in those few jurisdictions not requiring
certificates of title. 70 Finally, deleting section 9-515(b) eliminates the
conflict with respect to manufactured homes and leaves perfection to
state certificate of title statutes. Indeed, four states have already
removed the section.7'
Revised Article 9 has simultaneously introduced uniformity and
confusion into the realm of manufactured home financing. The
priority rule of section 9-334(e)(4) largely will silence the debate
between the priority of certificates of title and real property
encumbrances. The extended financing statement effectiveness of
section 9-515(b), though, will create a new subject of controversy in
an historically contentious area. Although section 9-515(b) might
apply in those states not requiring perfection of a security interest on
a certificate of title, the section's potential scope is exceedingly
narrow. At worst, section 9-515(b) will cause confusion among
practitioners and courts; at best, legislators will use the conflict as an
opportunity to revisit and directly address the tenuous relationship
between the UCC and certificate of title legislation.

MARK R. KooNTZ

68. The surprising result in In re Wester illustrates the uncertain boundaries of
certificate of title requirements.
69. This approach, while giving effect to section 9-515(b), deprives the creditor of the
priority rule of section 9-334(e)(4), which operates only when certificates of title are
present. If the jurisdiction is unsettled in its case law regarding the priority of financing
statements as against real property encumbrances, this approach may create renewed
uncertainty.
70. Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont do not require certificates
of title for manufactured homes. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
71. See supranote 40 and accompanying text.

